Matthew Coller: Dallas Turner pick is about calculating the reward

There is an argument that coaches have long made about using analytics in game management decision making that might apply to the Minnesota Vikings and drafting Dallas Turner. It goes something like: Over the long haul, the analytics will point to the right answer but in a given situation there are lots of different factors that broad data analysis can’t cover.

Let’s say that the numbers suggest that the team should go for a fourth down rather than punting. The coach sees his interior offensive line getting blown up and his QB getting skittish in the pocket and the opposing offense hasn’t moved the ball all day. Alright, boot that thing away.

Of course, if a coach is using this angle too often then it probably means they are using it as a blowoff rather than actual reasoning. But if a coach is generally in line with going for fourth downs and two-point conversions at the right time, we still may see certain decisions on a given Sunday that do not line up.

The Vikings trading up to select the Alabama star rusher is not a decision that is backed by many folks who write about data in football. ESPN’s Bill Barnwell wrote a massive article on the history and risks of trading up and SumerSports’ Eric Eager pointed out that edge rushers picked in the range of Turner only have their fifth-year options picked up 53% of the time.

The draft value charts were not a fan of the move to pick Turner, particularly if you add in what it cost for the Vikings to get the 23rd overall pick. I suppose you can debate whether that’s fair since we know that they acquired No. 23 to give themselves a chance to land Drake Maye in a trade up — it wasn’t exactly for Turner.

Either way, sending No. 167 and two mid-round picks next year is a lot.

On the Purple Insider podcast, Vikings GM Kwesi Adofo-Mensah said that what he respected about Wolves president of basketball operations Tim Connelly was that he was willing to push the chips to the middle of the table on the Rudy Gobert trade despite criticism that the Wolves gave up too much. That decision has paid off in spades this year for Minnesota’s basketball club. We can pretty easily make the connection between going all-in for Gobert and the mentality that Adofo-Mensah was taking when moving up to get Turner.

Here’s where the right-here-right-now mentality of the coach cliche comes in. The Vikings must have felt that their situation under a microscope made the ultra-aggressive play more reasonable. There are a few factors we can bake into the analysis that apply specifically to this trade rather than the broad history of moving up.

One is that this was a very strange year in the draft. The only defensive player in the top 10 of Arif Hasan’s consensus big board was Turner. Not to mention three quarterbacks who were not top-10 consensus players were taken in the top 12 picks. The six overall top-12 QBs was a record — by a mile — and it pushed everyone else down the board.

It wasn’t by accident. Teams at the top were incredibly desperate to take QBs and none of them wanted to be like Washington when they took Chase Young and passed up on Justin Herbert and Tua Tagovailoa.

You can’t exactly say that Turner was more like the 11th pick than the 17th but since the QB-needy teams weren’t even considering going with a defensive player in their spots then it seems like something we have to factor. If the Vikings traded a third, fourth and 167 for the 11th overall pick, the charts might be more friendly.

Turner ranked ninth on the consensus board. He was a highly productive player with 10.0 sacks and strong underlying numbers like QB pressures and pass-rush win rate. He is a fit for Brian Flores’ defense with his versatility. He scored in the 89th percentile by Relative Athletic Score — though that was due to being undersized. He was 99th, 96th, 90th, 99th and 97th in the drills that he participated in and has an 88th percentile wingspan.

If we look historically at top-15 consensus edge rushers since the Hasan started doing a consensus board in 2017, we find the following group:

2017 — Myles Garrett, Solomon Thomas, Hasaan Reddick, Derek Barnett

2018 — Bradley Chubb, Harold Landry

2019 — Nick Bosa, Josh Allen, Brian Burns, Montez Sweat

2020 — Chase Young

2021 — Kwity Paye

2022 — Aidan Hutchinson, Kayvon Thibodeaux, Travon Walker, Jermaine Johnson

2023 — Will Anderson, Tyree Wilson, Myles Murphy

Included in this bunch are edge rushers that rank No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 19 in average annual salary. It won’t be long before Hutchinson and Anderson join that list.

There are also some busts and mid players mixed in. That’s the risk. If he turns out to be as good as Kwity Paye, who had 8.5 sacks last year and ranked 39th among edge rushers by PFF, then they probably gave up too much. It’s a high bar. But the reward is absolutely massive.

Turner is set to make around $16 million over the four years that he’s on his rookie deal. Brian Burns makes $28 million per year. If Turner becomes a top-notch player, which his background and consensus board ranking would suggest is possible, the gap in cap savings between Turner and the top edge rushers is enormous. It’s not exactly the same level cap hack as a rookie QB contract but it’s getting closer as edge rusher prices go up. That has to matter in the equation.

We have to look at the Vikings specifically as a landing spot for this move. This year’s roster is not ready to win a Super Bowl but nobody should be drafting rookies to be the “final piece” to a Super Bowl team anyway. Usually it’s 2-3 years out. In the case of the Vikings roster, we can see everything lining up for their “window” to really open in 2025.

For teams that have successfully picked QBs in the draft, Year 2 or 3 is when they have usually taken the leap forward. We saw this from the Chiefs with Patrick Mahomes, Bills with Josh Allen, Bengals with Joe Burrow, the Eagles with Jalen Hurts, the Ravens with Lamar Jackson etc.

Yes, you have to hit on the quarterback but everyone knows that. If that QB is ready to roll, then it’s go time with the rest of the roster.

It has been noted that the Vikings have $100 million in cap space to work with next year. It’s important that their cap space number isn’t inflated because they have no talent. Assuming Justin Jefferson signs an extension, the only players set to be free agents next year that are currently starters are Aaron Jones, Byron Murphy Jr., Harrison Smith, Harrison Phillips and Cam Bynum.

With most of the Vikings’ positions filled with young players or players in their prime, they can use their cap space to sign more starters in free agency where needed and fill out the depth. We have to remember that the Wilf ownership has not been afraid to push money down the road when they are in win-now mode as we saw from 2018 and 2019 (and unfortunately too many years after that as well).

Drafting third and fourth rounders in 2025 could eventually matter. Will it matter in 2025 and 2026 when they are looking for the roster to peak? Hard to say. It is worth noting that the Vikings have not picked a difference-making third or fourth-rounder since 2015.

So specifically within the context of this draft, this team, this player, this position, the trade up for Turner looks different than your usual “we love that guy” trade up.

What are the odds that it pays off big time? Well, just like those fourth downs, the difference between it paying off and failing are probably close. But it’s not just a matter of works vs. doesn’t work. The Vikings took the path that is more likely to lead to something special. The “works” side of the equation comes with huge payoff. The “doesn’t work” comes with some penalty but hardly insurmountable.

There are different ways to interpret the math. Adofo-Mensah described it as “taking off the Clark Kent glasses” despite his appreciation for spreadsheets and calculators. But on one side of the spreadsheet the calculation comes out with the Vikings landing a cornerstone player that helps them compete for a Super Bowl. In their mind that was worth the other side of the pie chart that may be a bit larger.