It is said that hardships do not change our character as much as reveal it. The misery, deaths, and economic dislocation from the pandemic have presented a challenge to every country on the planet—and we are not at the end of this affliction. But how might Covid affect international behavior, and is it too far-fetched to think there might even be some positive indirect effects from Covid?
Maybe not so far-fetched. Many have noted that on a personal level, the work-from-home movement and the reduction of travel have occasionally had unintended benefits: more time with family and more time for reflection or for hobbies.
Is there an international analogy? Vladimir Putin might not be spending more time with his family, but Covid could have an impact on international behavior.
Simply put, the advent of the pandemic alters decision-making in two important ways: Covid weakens national economic performance and it raises the costs of new ventures. By injecting an additional element of risk, one might expect a reduction in risky behavior. Let’s look at two countries that have been pursuing international boundary and territorial claims in recent years: Russia and China.
China has much greater capabilities than Russia, but it also faces higher stakes in 2022. In terms of capabilities, China has robust social management tools such as lockdowns and tracing technologies. Perhaps more importantly, it also has a successful economy, with the IMF pegging its GDP growth at 5.6%, so it has a greater ability to withstand disruption and can even compensate businesses and individuals to some extent.
The higher stakes? China hosts the Olympics in February and later this year convenes the Communist Party Congress, its showcase national political event. My prediction is that if we put all this together, through this year at least, China will have little appetite for forcing or raising discretionary international issues. That being said, China will retain acute sensitivity to Taiwan and other core issues, and will feel compelled to act if it believes those core issues are threatened. In other words, against the backdrop of Covid, China will not go looking for trouble.
Russia, on the other hand, appears open to (and even seduced by) the idea of looking for trouble. It has a weaker economy, with the IMF reporting 2.9% growth. It has to grapple with a more punishing pandemic, with reports of wide-spread undercounting of Covid morbidity. In the middle of this turbulence, it has decided to force broader issues of Ukraine's international orientation and the future of NATO in an effort to extract some concessions from the U.S. Putin’s policy initiatives will play out in the days ahead, with the next round of U.S.-Russia negotiations to take place this week in Geneva. If one wanted to be sympathetic to President Putin, one could claim that he has played a weak hand remarkably well. But this only suggests a less-sympathetic point: why is he playing this hand at all given Covid, the other problems he faces, and the broad political stability Europe currently enjoys?
Assuming my prognosis of a more restrained China and a less restrained Russia this year is accurate, why this divergence? Governance is one reason. Both Presidents Xi and Putin are strong leaders, but China embodies more elements of collective leadership, whereas Putin has more autocratic powers. The economic difference is another reason. The IMF places China’s GDP at just over ten times Russia’s GDP. China can engage other countries with trade and investment. Russia’s most potent engagement tool is not economic, but politico-military.
The bottom line: Maybe Covid does not so much shape the world we are in, as it reveals the pre-existing inclinations. President Xi seems much more aware of the challenges and costs of brinkmanship and does not display any particular desire for it. President Putin seems to relish it, heedless of the potential costs to Russia.
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