Why on Earth are U.S. troops in Syria?
What exactly are these men and women in uniform being tasked to do? When will they finally come home?
Ask U.S. officials any of these questions, and you tend to get the company line. The United States is in Syria, they insist, to ensure the “enduring defeat” of the Islamic State. Until this objective is achieved, U.S. forces will remain there to train, advise, and if necessary, accompany partner forces in the field to root out ISIS remnants. The explanations have largely stayed the same over the last several years, even as the situation has markedly changed since the U.S. military began counter-ISIS operations over seven years ago.
In 2014, ISIS was as much a quasi-army as it was a traditional terrorist group. It was capable enough to capture and hold entire cities. ISIS was also the richest terrorist group on the planet, earning roughly $1 million a day through extortion, taxes on those who lived under its rule, and the sale of black market oil. The group’s capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014 not only stunned the disorganized, ineffective Iraqi army, but netted the group hundreds of millions of dollars in antiquities and bank deposits. ISIS controlled 81,000 square miles of territory at its height, slightly larger than the United Kingdom. Tens of thousands of young men were not only willing to join the organization, but die for it.
The ISIS of 2021 is far different. Tens of thousands of the group’s fighters have been killed, and ISIS territory is very greatly depleted. In fact, ISIS hasn’t controlled any territory since March 2019, when U.S. air power, in conjunction with Kurdish and Arab ground militias, squeezed the group out of the Syrian town of Baghouz. While there could be as many as 10,000 ISIS militants operating in Syria and Iraq, they have difficulty moving around. ISIS attacks these days are a combination of opportunistic, isolated assaults against vulnerable checkpoints and the occasional suicide attack against a soft target. Even those low-profile, rudimentary attacks are down considerably, according to the Defense Department’s own lead inspector general for the counter-ISIS mission.
Some argue that ISIS could return to strength if President Joe Biden withdraws the nearly 1,000 U.S. troops in Syria. Communities in eastern Syria, particularly the Kurds, are concerned a U.S. departure would render their areas exposed to an ISIS reconquest. This argument, however, suggests other players in Syria, such as the Kurds, Russia, the Syrian government, Turkish-backed forces, and Iranian-backed militias, don’t have agency of their own.
This couldn’t be further from the truth. Indeed, Syrian and Russian warplanes have been bombing ISIS positions in the Syrian desert for months, as the Pentagon itself acknowledges. Kurdish units continue to conduct ground operations against ISIS cells in Deir ez-Zor province, and they are increasingly executing those raids independently. The Iraqis, meanwhile, are actually reaching outside their own borders to nab top ISIS figures, likely with some degree of support from others in the region. Frankly put, all of these actors will continue to fight ISIS with or without a U.S. troop presence in Syria. The reason? Doing so is in their own self-interest.
Therefore, the question U.S. policymakers need to ask is: What sense does it make to put the lives of U.S. troops at risk when the threat ISIS now poses can be outsourced to local stakeholders? What is the point of dodging rockets and drones at small outposts such as al Tanf if our presence there is no longer required?
The answer, simply, is there is no point at all.
The U.S. military has accomplished its counterterrorism mission in Syria, and nobody can dispute this fact. The ISIS territorial caliphate is history, and its chances of coming back are extremely limited by a confluence of factors, most notably the incentive of regional governments to prevent its resurgence.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.