Is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan on the near horizon?
The question is legitimate. China has been flexing its muscles this month, sending about 150 fighter and bomber aircraft through the southwest portion of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated what has been a key plank of the Chinese Communist Party’s platform since nationalists fled mainland China in 1949. Sooner or later, Xi said, Taiwan must be reunified with the motherland.
Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces are in Taiwan, training its forces. This rotational deployment has lasted for more than a year.
The cacophony of activity around Taiwan is raising the temperature in Washington, too. The Biden administration is internally divided about whether Xi is itching to launch an assault on the democratically ruled island. Increasingly, lawmakers on Capitol Hill are advising U.S. policymakers to discard the decades-old concept of “strategic ambiguity,” in which the United States holds China in suspense about whether U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion. Others, such as Rep. Elaine Luria, are advocating for a preemptive authorization for the use of military force to defend Taiwan.
It’s well past time for policymakers to sit down and ask a simple question. Namely, is the U.S. really prepared to go to war with China in order to defend Taiwan? More importantly, should it?
The conventional Washington view is that, yes, the U.S. should indeed save Taiwan from being squeezed into a red-tinted oblivion. They suggest that anything short of a full-fledged U.S. commitment would put a cavernous hole in U.S. credibility. They suggest it would embolden China to annex more territory and scare allies such as Japan and South Korea, who would question Washington’s mutual defense guarantee.
Yet, nowhere in this conversation is a discussion about just how bloody, destabilizing, and potentially catastrophic a conflict would be. This is especially true with regards to a dispute over Taiwan. It’s an extremely sensitive issue for the Communist Party.
The concept of “strategic clarity” making the rounds in Washington, whereby the U.S. provides Taiwan with a formal defense commitment a la South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, or NATO, is one that should be thrown into the garbage. With a U.S. security promise stated upfront, the argument goes, deterrence would be secured and the status quo assured.
Unfortunately, deterrence only works if the country we are seeking to deter (in this case, China) genuinely believes the U.S. would react strongly and swiftly. Deterrence also won’t be effective if China views the reunification of Taiwan as an objective so vital to its security interests that its leadership is willing to endure the most painful military, economic, and diplomatic repercussions. The U.S. simply can’t make those assumptions on Taiwan. As Mike Sweeney, my colleague at Defense Priorities, argued in a paper this March, “Reunification [of Taiwan] goes beyond a vital interest to a basic article of faith in China’s destiny.”
The only thing clear about “strategic clarity” is that it’s incredibly risky. It’s a big, fat finger poked in both of China’s eyes. The concept isn’t necessarily helpful for the Taiwanese either, who (like other allies under similar commitments) would likely use an unbridled defense pledge as an excuse to piggyback on the U.S. without building an independent military capacity.
The Biden administration will have to find a sweet spot on its Taiwan policy. Strategic clarity isn’t it.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
