Managerial Report Cards: American League Division Series

This postseason, I’m trying out a new feature: managerial report cards. After each postseason round, I’ll look at the losing managers and assess their performance when it comes to in-game management. Pinch hit for your MVP candidate with a pitcher? Not that it would ever happen, but you’d get an F for that. Bring in your best pitcher in a big spot, only to have him give up a three-run homer? That’s still an A, results notwithstanding.

These grades don’t cover everything that a manager does. Deploying your best players in the biggest spots and hiding their weaknesses where possible is a big part of a manager’s role, but it’s definitely not the only part. As an example, Kevin Cash and the entire Rays staff deserve a permanent A for their work in getting their pitchers and hitters ready for flexible roles all season long. Likewise, Dave Roberts and the Dodgers coaching staff benched a former MVP and seem to have kept the clubhouse roughly in order, always a tough task. None of that will be reflected in these rankings, but it’s absolutely important managerial work — it’s simply work I don’t have much insight into.

Kevin Cash, Tampa Bay Rays

Lineups/Pinch Hitting: C
Cash mostly used his lineups creatively, matching his players’ strengths with the opposing pitcher’s. The Red Sox went heavily to lefties in this series — Eduardo Rodriguez started two games and Chris Sale one. That meant a heaping helping of Jordan Luplow, Manuel Margot, and Yandy Díaz, three players on the team for their ability to hit left-handed pitching. When Nathan Eovaldi started Game 3, all three of those hitters were out of the lineup, replaced by Austin Meadows, Ji-Man Choi, and Joey Wendle.

That’s classic Rays maneuvering, but two things hold me back from giving Cash a better grade. First, when the Red Sox sprung a gambit on him in Rodriguez’s first start, pulling him after nine batters and using Nick Pivetta for bulk, I don’t think Cash responded quickly enough. The Rays won comfortably, so it’s hard to fault him too heavily, but there were some weird at-bats in there: Luplow got plenty of run against right-handed pitching and Meadows didn’t appear in the game.

Those two decisions led to an adjustment before Rodriguez’s second start. This time, Meadows was in the starting lineup, with Margot left on the bench. I’m not sure either configuration was “correct,” but I do fault Cash for playing into Boston’s hands somewhat — my second complaint. The Red Sox had a clear lefty tilt in the starting rotation and a righty tilt in the bullpen. Their only lefty relievers were Josh Taylor, Martín Pérez, and Austin Davis, none of whom set the world on fire this year (Taylor was the best of the bunch).

Given that, if I were Cash, I’d get my lefties in as soon as Boston’s starting pitching departed and dare them to use their lefty relievers. Platoon advantages are just that — advantages, not set-in-stone matchups. I’d rather have a lefty-lefty matchup featuring a so-so reliever than a righty-righty matchup featuring, say, Tanner Houck. Yet Houck barely had to face the Rays’ platoon lefties; he faced Choi twice, but he also got Díaz and Margot twice each, and other right-handers besides. Díaz got 16 plate appearances in the series — 10 were against righties. Six of Margot’s eight PAs were against righties. Only Luplow had a more normal mix — five shots at lefties, against only three tough matchups.

Meanwhile, the lefty bats barely got to play. Wendle racked up only four PAs, Choi seven, and Meadows nine — this in spite of the fact that the Red Sox used righties against 114 batters and lefties against only 44. There was time to play the lefty bats — but more often than not, they had either already been used or remained on the bench. Overall, Cash didn’t do enough to put his batters in the best position to succeed, though Boston’s roster construction made it a tricky situation overall.

Pitching: B+
Cash is almost always great. I have the utmost respect for his ability to manage a bullpen. I have only one quibble: I think he got too cute with Collin McHugh in the last game of the series. McHugh started the game for Tampa Bay, but he’s a reliever: he topped out at 11 batters faced in an outing this year. He cruised through two innings — seven batters faced and only 18 pitches.

The Rays planned on going the bulk route and bringing in Shane McClanahan, and they stuck with their plan despite McHugh’s efficiency. I wouldn’t have. Even if you only want McHugh to face the order one time through, let him face the last two righties in Boston’s order, then bring in a single-inning reliever to close it out. Let McClanahan start the fourth with a clean inning (a worthy goal for sure), and go from there.

If you want to keep McHugh on a tight leash, that’s fine — but I’d rather get extra outs out of my cruising pitcher and figure the rest out later in an elimination game. Given that you’re still using most of the same pitchers, it’s not a game-swinging decision — but little edges matter, and letting McHugh record more outs sounds like a good move to me. It’s a small quibble, and perhaps McClanahan just didn’t have it that night, but I would have handled it differently.

Tony La Russa, Chicago White Sox

Lineups/Pinch Hitting: A-
The White Sox didn’t have many levers to pull in this one. They have two spots that resemble a platoon: DH, where Gavin Sheets and Andrew Vaughn are a straight platoon, and second base/right field, where two of Leury García, Adam Engel, and César Hernández usually play, with García being La Russa’s first choice.

The DHs alternated based on the handedness of Houston’s starters. Engel started the first two games, went 0-6, and didn’t bat again until Game 4 was all but decided. I’m fine with that — I don’t see much daylight between Hernández and Engel, and I’m certainly not against swapping one out for the other at the slightest sign of discomfort or injury.

That’s basically all the substituting that the White Sox did. They ran their players out and lived with the consequences. I would have liked to see slightly more willingness to pinch hit when they were behind, but it’s not like they have obvious upgrades just waiting on the bench to come in. For the most part, I think this was handled well.

Pitching: C
Liam Hendriks pitched three times in this series, and never once when the game was in question. That sounds bad, like it augurs an automatic F, but I really don’t think that’s the case. The White Sox simply got their butts handed to them, and at a certain point, there just aren’t enough close spots to properly use Hendriks (and Craig Kimbrel).

In the highest-leverage Astros at-bat of the series (bottom of the fifth inning of Game 2 with the bases loaded and the White Sox ahead by two), Garrett Crochet faced Yuli Gurriel. That sounds like a marginally bad matchup — Crochet is a solid reliever, but he’s a lefty, while Gurriel is right-handed and would single to score a run. But Crochet wasn’t in the game for Gurriel — he was in the game for the fourth-highest-leverage at-bat of the series, the previous one against Yordan Alvarez. That’s a good matchup for Chicago; Alvarez simply drew a walk.

Another big spot: Alvarez faced Aaron Bummer in the bottom of the seventh in the same game (runners on first and third, two outs, tie score). Alvarez singled to break the tie. In the tightest spots all year, the White Sox called on two very good left-handed pitchers, and they lost to Yordan Alvarez and Yuli Gurriel. That’s no knock on La Russa.

On the other hand, I wasn’t enamored with his willingness to leave his starters in. Lance Lynn faced 20 batters in the first game of the series, and while he didn’t have a great day, it didn’t need to be as bad as it was. Through three innings, he’d allowed three runs, and when he came back out for the fourth, he got to two outs with a runner on first. I would have grabbed Lynn already — but he faced Jose Altuve for a third time, and Altuve lined a double to left — second and third, two outs.

This isn’t actually a huge-leverage spot, because it’s hard to come back from down three runs. On the other hand, a single essentially ends the game. Why not bring in the big guns rather than let a clearly laboring Lynn take on professional hitter (™) Michael Brantley? Brantley did what he gets paid for, two runs scored, thanks for playing Chicago.

Those high-leverage Crochet battles? They came after Lucas Giolito faced the Houston order a third time and walked two of the three batters he faced before La Russa pulled him. Giolito had been scuffling with command — three walks and four strikeouts his first two times through the order — and the White Sox have a fearsome bullpen. With a day off imminent and most pitchers rested, it wouldn’t be crazy to piece together five innings with Hendriks, Kimbrel, Bummer, Michael Kopech, Ryan Tepera, and Crochet (who had pitched the day before). Instead, Giolito stayed in, and then the first reliever out of the ‘pen was the one who pitched the day before. Not how you’d draw it up!

One last iffy starting situation: in the fourth game of the series, Carlos Rodón was sometimes overpowering but sometimes scattershot. This was it for Chicago, win or go home. The second-highest-leverage at-bat of the series for Houston was Carlos Correa, with the bases loaded and Chicago up by one.

I would have pulled Rodón, and I said so at the time. But I thought it was a close call, much closer than the other times La Russa left a starter in, so I’m not surprised he stuck with Rodón. This early in the game, with Rodón looking mostly rejuvenated, it’s not an obvious call to the ‘pen by any means. Correa doubled, the Astros never trailed again, and that was the series.

Chicago’s starting pitchers were great this year but awful in this series. How awful? They threw a combined 12.1 innings in four starts. They struck out 13 and walked 12. Their aggregate ERA? A putrid 10.22. You can’t manage your way out of that.

I’d like a manager to try to manage out of that, though. There’s no magic spell that prevents Hendriks from occasionally coming into a game early. There’s no ban on early Kimbrel appearances, though I know he’s not fond of them. You can’t fix disastrous starts like the ones that doomed the White Sox, but I think leaning more on a strong bullpen was the smart play.

Tony La Russa out-pointing Kevin Cash? I didn’t expect to file a card that came to that conclusion. I still think Cash did a better job — La Russa didn’t have much agency in running his offense, which means it was hard for him to get anything but a solid grade. On the pitching side, which undoubtedly matters more in the AL, Cash came out ahead. But both managers had their ups and downs, and I don’t think either did anything egregious. It’s really hard to manage the myriad situations that come up in a short, high-pressure series, and that’s the real takeaway from this.