At a recent summit in Tajikistan, Iran was accepted into the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an economic and political alliance. In the short run, Iran’s membership in the SCO will not guarantee economic gains. However, amid a U.S. retreat from vital areas of interest, Iran’s acceptance into the organization is a harbinger for closer cooperation between Iran and China, as well as China’s bid for greater international prominence.
Importantly, Iran’s ascension to the SCO took place amid the Biden administration’s renewed effort to bring Iran back into compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2018. Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, has signaled an interest in continuing negotiations but only from a position of strength. As a result, the negotiations over the deal have stalled since June.
In March, before Iran was an SCO member, leaders from Tehran and Beijing signed a 25-year strategic partnership deal. Taken together, this agreement and the stalled JCPOA negotiations show that the recent changes in U.S. relations with Iran and China have resulted in closer China-Iran cooperation.
Since 1979, Iran’s anti-American orientation has made for high political tensions with the United States. Despite a spurt of misplaced optimism for an Iran-U.S. rapprochement under the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have only exacerbated such tension since the 2000s.
Under the Trump administration, a policy of “maximum pressure” against Iran effectively deterred China from close cooperation with Tehran. For example, China’s purchase of Iranian oil against U.S. sanctions was brought down to low levels under President Donald Trump. For China, cooperation with the Islamic Republic has consistently remained secondary to relations with the U.S.
This is further exemplified by the fact that Iran first bid for SCO membership in 2005 but was not admitted with China’s green light until now. Even in June 2020, when rumors about the 25-year strategic partnership deal with Iran surfaced, Beijing did not enter into any public agreement with Tehran. As long as the U.S. stood firm against Iran, China consistently refused to risk cooperation.
The Biden administration has shown a determination to reengage with Iran and revive the JCPOA, creating an incentive to encourage closer China-Iran cooperation in the event that such relations could help reestablish the nuclear deal. This orientation of the Biden administration changed China’s strategic calculation with regard to Iran and prompted Beijing to move cautiously toward closer cooperation with Tehran.
In March, Iran and China signed the long-rumored 25-year strategic partnership deal in high profile. Joey Hood, President Joe Biden’s acting assistant secretary of state for the Middle East, commented on the deal, saying, “We want Iran and China to have a good, healthy, productive relationship.” This reveals the Biden administration’s willingness to foster China-Iran ties.
The Biden administration’s acceptance of closer China-Iran cooperation is occurring alongside China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, known as “major country diplomacy.” This foreign policy aims to assert Chinese power materially and rhetorically. China’s mega-investment projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the combative “wolf-warrior” diplomacy are clear examples of this policy.
The Biden administration’s approach to Iran and its cooperation with China is self-defeating. While the U.S. acquiesces to closer China-Iran cooperation in the name of “reengagement” with Iran, China’s illicit purchases of Iranian oil have skyrocketed. Yet, turning a blind eye to China’s purchases of Iranian oil in contravention of U.S. sanctions failed to bring Iran back to the negotiation table. Rather, it has given the regime a financial lifeline to continue its harmful actions. Put differently, what was intended to incentivize Iran to talk became an incentive to be obstinate.
China’s admission of Iran into the SCO is built on this same momentum. Although neither the 25-year deal signed by both countries nor SCO membership will bring Iran more than short-term prestige, the Biden administration’s reengagement with Iran is nonetheless lowering barriers between Tehran and Beijing.
If the administration continues to signal an eagerness for reengagement with Iran, as well as an aversion to competition and a willingness to retreat in the key areas of Chinese interest, then it will find itself losing influence in multiple theaters of conflict to a growing Chinese-Iranian entente.
Wang Xiyue is a Jeane Kirkpatrick fellow at American Enterprise Institute.
